From the Ashes of Kelley v. EPA: Framing the Next Step of the CERCLA Lender Liability Debate by Geisinger, Alex C.
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ALEX C. GEISINGER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' to deal with the improper
disposal of hazardous waste. Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is primarily responsible for cleaning up hazardous substance
releases.' Whether EPA chooses to clean up the release itself' or to oversee
a cleanup by responsible parties' the ultimate liability for cleanup generally
falls not on the EPA but on any number of "potentially responsible parties"
(PRPs)' These PRPs include "the owner and operator of a vessel or facility"6
and "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of."7
A complex and troubling question is whether a lender who takes on ownership
or management of property in order to preserve a security interest is an
"owner" or "operator" as contemplated by the statute, thereby incurring
liability for CERCLA damages.
The statute attempts to answer this question in its definition of the term
"owner or operator," which carves out an exception for the secured lender who
"without participating in the management of a vessel or facility... holds indicia
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1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
2. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606. If EPA cleans the release itself, it may seek reimbursement
from responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CERCLA imposes joint and several liability without regard for
causation. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 576.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Facility is defined broadly to include:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer
use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(q).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). Other potentially liable parties include those who arrange for
transport, disposal, or treatment of hazardous waste and any person who accepts any hazardous
substance for transport to a site they choose for treatment or disposal. Id. at §§ 9607(a)(3)-(4).
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of ownership primarily to protect his security interest."' Though the language
of this secured creditor exemption appears to be quite certain, courts have both
construed and applied the exemption differently. This has created significant
confusion as to when a lender may be held liable for CERCLA cleanup costs.
This confusion prompted the EPA to release a rule interpreting the lender
liability exemption.' In a recent decision, however, the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia held that EPA was not empowered to issue
the rule." The decision not only reinvigorates the earlier judge-made lender
liability standards but further injects another standard, that of the rule, into the
lender liability debate."
In an attempt to frame the upcoming debates which will be certain to
follow the Kelley decision in both Congress and the courts, this article will
analyze the competing lender liability standards and interpretations, focusing
on the regulatory response contained in the EPA's recent rule. In particular
the article will demonstrate how any liability scheme which allows lenders to
foreclose without incurring liability undercuts numerous incentives to monitor
and police environmental compliance. Finally, the article will propose two
different solutions to the lender liability problem. These solutions, while
imperfect, represent alternatives which should be considered before accepting
any of the present standards.
I. CASE LAW CONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF LENDER LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA
Two different lines of legal reasoning have shaped the scope of lender
liability as it exists under CERCLA. The first line of reasoning emphasized
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
9. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 300).
10. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
11. The Kelley court determined that EPA had acted ultra vires when it promulgated the rule
because Congress had not delegated to EPA the responsibility for issuing lender liability
standards. Id. at 1105-08. As of Spring, 1994, Congress is moving rapidly to remedy this
perceived lack of delegation. Sections of the CERCLA reauthorization bills recently introduced
in Congress explicitly allow EPA to issue regulations on the lender liability issue. Quick Action
on Administration's Proposals Said "Imperative" After Lender Liability Ruling, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1890 (Mar. 14, 1994). Even if CERCLA reauthorization is not enacted this year,
congressional aides have stated that Congress would take up the lender liability delegation
separately before the end of the session. See, e.g., Congress Will Act on Lender Liability Even
if Reauthorization Fails, Aide Predicts, 24 Env't Rep. 2068-69 (Apr. 8, 1994) (quoting Roger
Goodman, chief of staff for Rep. Rick Boucher (D-Va.)).
Even if Congress delays in giving EPA express authorization for reissuing lender liability
rules, it would be absurd to suggest that because of Kelley the rule will have no import on the
issue of lender liability. First, it is likely EPA will use the rule as the standard it will follow when
identifying PRPs for its own contribution actions. Second, the rule is the compromise product
of a long, comprehensive process and will thus likely have significant impact on judicial
interpretations of the lender liability issue in general and on analysis of the environmental and
economic impacts of certain decisions in particular, regardless of Kelley.
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actual participation in "day-to-day" management decisions.' 2 Later decisions,
however, have led courts to a new standard. These decisions, starting with the
infamous Fleet Factors case,13 abandoned the earlier focus on actual manage-
ment participation and now focus on whether the lender's position or status
enable it to affect management decisions.
A. Day-to-Day Operations and the Conflict on Post-Foreclosure Liability
In United States v. Mirabile,4 the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania became the first court to consider the question of lender
liability under CERCLA. In Mirabile, the court considered the liability of two
different banks involved in the financing of a paint manufacturing company
(Turco). American Bank and Trust Company (American) loaned Turco money
in 1973,"5 and secured its loan in part with the property. 6 American fore-
closed on its mortgage in 1981 and was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale
of the property. Four months later American assigned its bid to the Mirabiles,
the defendants who had purchased the property.' In the time between the
sheriff's sale and assignment of their bid, American secured the building against
vandalism, inquired about the cost of disposing various drums on the property,
and showed the property to prospective purchasers.'
The second bank was Mellon Bank (Mellon). In 1976, its predecessor in
interest, Girard Bank, entered into a financing agreement with Turco secured
by Turco's inventory and assets.' Some time thereafter, Turco created an
advisory board to oversee the company's operations and a loan officer from
Mellon was appointed to serve on that board." After Turco's bankruptcy,
Mellon appointed a new representative to the Turco board and increased its
monitoring of Turco's financial condition.2'
Both banks filed motions for summary judgment based on the secured
lender exemption. The District Court determined that "before a secured
creditor... may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-
day operational aspects of the site. '  The court noted both statutory andpolicy reasons for this conclusion. The statutory argument focused on
12. See infra Part I(A).
13. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991). For a discussion of Fleet, see infra Part I.B.
14. United States v. Mirabile, No. Civ. 84-2280, 1985 WL 97 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985).
15. Actually, American had loaned the money to Turco's predecessor, Mangels. When Turco
took control of Mangels they also took responsibility for Mangel's debt to American. Id. at *4.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *5.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Actually, Girard, the predecessor of Mellon, increased the monitoring at this time. Id.
22. Id. at *6.
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CERCLA's exemption for secured creditors who do not participate in the
management of a facility 3 The district court, interpreting the statute, stated,
"The reference to management of the 'facility,' as opposed to management of
the affairs of the actual owner or operator of the facility, suggests once again
that the participation which is critical is participation in operational, production,
or waste disposal activities."24 The court thus narrowed the realm of activities
that might incur liability to those activities that affect actual facility activity.
The court also noted CERCLA policy in making its determination. It
turned to an earlier decision by the District Court of Missouri,25 in which that
court gleaned from the statutory scheme and legislative history an intent to
impose cleanup costs on those who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal
and who were involved in the planning and implementation of the disposal
practices." The day-to-day management standard satisfied the court's analysis.
Under that standard, lenders were liable only when they participated in the
planning and implementation of industrial activity to the extent that such
practice affected the day-to-day operation of the facility and, therefore,
decisions regarding use and disposal of hazardous substances.
Application of the day-to-day management standard yielded opposite
results for the two banks in Mirabile. The court described American's actions
simply as foreclosing and taking prudent steps to protect the bank's security
interest in the property and secure against depreciation.27 These activities, the
court concluded, did not rise to the level of influencing day-to-day operational
management. Mellon Bank, on the other hand, was denied summary judgment.
Peter McWilliams, Mellon's representative on the Turco board," testified that
"he became involved with Turco because his superiors at Mellon wanted him
to have 'more day-to-day hands-on involvement."' 29 Based on this testimony,
the court denied summary judgment in order to get a clearer picture of
McWilliams' participation on the board." The distinction in treatment thus
rested on the characterization of each bank's participation in Turco's manage-
ment.
A stricter view of the secured lender exemption was espoused by the next
court to deal with the problem of lender liability under CERCLA. In United
States v. Maryland Bank and Trust3 1 the District Court for the District of
23. See 42 U.S.C. §101(20)(A).
24. Mirabile, 1985 WL 97 at *4.
25. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987).
26. Mirabile, 1985 WL 97 at *10.
27. Id. at *6.
28. Id. at *7.
29. Id. at *8.
30. Id. at *9.
31. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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Maryland. rejected the Mirabile day-to-day management standard and
announced that CERCLA liability attaches to any secured lender who
forecloses on contaminated property.
Maryland Bank and Trust (MBT) foreclosed on property in 1981, and
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale in 1982.32 In 1983, MBT
refused to honor EPA's request to clean up hazardous waste on the property.
Thereafter, EPA cleaned the property and initiated suit to recover its costs.33
At the time the case came before the Maryland Court, MBT still owned the
property.34
The Maryland court developed a different analysis of the statutory
exemption for secured lenders. First, it noted that once a party qualified as an
owner/operator under section 107(a)(1) (which MBT did), the burden switched
to the defendant to prove it was entitled to the exemption. The court then
invoked congressional intent and public policy in determining that the
exemption is lost upon foreclosure.
The court first noted that the purpose for the statutory exemption was
limited to protecting lenders in states where title passes to mortgagees:
Congress intended by this exception to exclude these common law title
mortgages from the definition of "owner" since title was in their hands only by
operation of the common law. The exclusion does not apply to former
mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure
sale 6
The court then noted that where, as here, the lender had actually taken further
action to gain title in the property, allowing the exemption would work to
enrich a secured creditor who purchased it at the foreclosure sale.
At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All
the other prospective purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA
liability, and would shy away from the sale. Yet once the property has been
cleared at the taxpayers' expense and becomes marketable, the mortgagee-
turned-owner would be in a position to sell the site at a profit.37
This is especially true considering the fact the exempted lender, as owner of the
property, would not be subject to any existing federal lien which might
encumber a site that the taxpayers have paid to clean.38 If the lender is not
32. d. at 575.
33. Id. at 576-77.
-34. Id. at 578.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 579. The court noted that this was particularly true where the former mortgagee
had held title to the property for a significant period of time prior to the cleanup. Id. Notably,
the court withheld its opinion as to the liability of a lender who purchased and promptly resold
the property. See id. at 579 n.5.
37. Id. at 580. See also infra Part II.A.
38. At present the only lien established in CERCLA is the federal lien provision of section
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1). This lien would not attach to property owned by secured lenders
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liable, it would reap a windfall at taxpayer's expense. The court thus held that,
after its foreclosure on the property, MBT was liable under CERCLA.
MBT and Mirabile, read together, create confusion over the proper
standard of liability for lenders who foreclose on their security. The decisions
do not directly conflict in situations where there has been no foreclosure
because the MBT Court was not directly concerned with this question. 9 The
Mirabile day-to-day standard thus seems most applicable to these circumstances.
Where a secured lender has foreclosed, however, the different theories may
lead to different results. Confronted with the possible application of two
different standards, a lender would be unsure of whether it could realize the
security on its property by foreclosing without risking extremely large cleanup
costs.
The next District Court to consider lender liability was confronted with the
choice of applying either the Mirabile or the MBT reasoning to a lender who
foreclosed on its security. In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing
Co., the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania resolved the
issue by applying the Mirabile standard prior to foreclosure and the MBT
standard after foreclosure.4" The Court clearly articulated its belief that there
should be an exemption for secured lenders prior to foreclosure:
There are policy reasons for exemption of secured creditors in the Bank's
position from CERCLA liability prior to the secured creditor's purchase of the
property at foreclosure. A goal of CERCLA is safe handling and disposal of
hazardous waste. To encourage banks to monitor a debtor's use of security
property, a high liability threshold will enhance the dual purposes of protection
of the banks' investments and promoting CERCLA's policy goals. Conversely,
a low liability standard would encourage a lender to terminate its association
with a financially troubled debtor and expedite loan payments in an effort to
recover the debts.4
Applying the above reasoning, the court found the day-to-day standard of
liability applicable to pre-foreclosure lending. The court also accepted the MBT
court's reasoning and standard concerning post-foreclosure activity.42 As
developed in Guidice, therefore, the early trend in the district courts was to
judge a lender by a day-to-day operation standard prior to foreclosure and a
for a few reasons. First, the lien can only attach based on a party's status as a potentially
responsible party under section 107(a), which lenders will be exempted from. Second, the lien
will only run until the lender's liability is satisfied. This is simply a corollary to the first
requirement and makes a lien against a lender's property valid only if the lender is liable in the
first place.
39. MBTs failure to consider what type of pre-foreclosure lender activity would incur liability
will be important for later discussion of the shortcomings of the different standards. See infra
Part II.
40. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-563 (W.D.
Pa. 1989).
41. Id. at 562.
42. Id. at 563.
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standard of strict liability upon foreclosure. This trend was disregarded,
however, by the first appellate court to consider lender liability in a CERCLA
cleanup case.
B. Fleet Factors
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., the Eleventh Circuit considered
an interlocutory appeal by Fleet Factors, a lending institution, from the trial
court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The basis of Fleet's motion
centered on the relationship between it and Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a
cloth printing facility. In 1976, Fleet entered a factoring agreement with SPW
in which Fleet advanced SPW funds against their accounts receivable.'
Although SPW initially filed for bankruptcy in 1979, the bankruptcy court
allowed Fleet to maintain its factoring agreement with the cloth company.
Finally, in 1981, when the amount owed to Fleet exceeded its secured interest,
Fleet stopped advancing money and SPW declared bankruptcy under
Chapter VII.
Fleet hired two contractors to help it recoup its investment. The first
contractor was hired to conduct an auction in June, 1982, to sell inventory and
equipment." Fleet then hired another contractor to remove any unsold
equipment and leave the premises in "broom clean" condition.46 Fleet never,
however, foreclosed on its interest in the SPW facility.47 Upon inspection of
the SPW plant in 1984, the EPA found and disposed of approximately 700
drums of hazardous waste and forty-four truckloads of material containing
asbestos.' The agency initiated suit against Fleet in the District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia to recover its clean-up costs. The District Court
adopted the Mirabile standard, focusing on two distinct periods of the
relationship between Fleet and SPW. Without explaining what factors it
actually considered, the District Court held as a matter of law that Fleet's
activity in the period prior to the entrance of either contractor upon the
premises did not rise to the level of liability.49 It then looked at the period
after the contractors entered the premises. Noting that the contractors may
have caused further hazardous waste releases during this time, the court found
that it could not grant summary judgment based on these and other disputed
43. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991).
44. Note as well that as further security Fleet took an interest in the facility and some of its
equipment, inventory and fixtures. Id. at 1552.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1553.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1553.
49. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
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facts."o
The Appellate Court agreed with the District Court's ruling that summary
judgment was not proper in this situation. However, the Appellate Court
expressly disagreed with the District Court's use of the Mirabile standard to
reach this conclusion."' The Appellate Court found the Mirabile standard too
permissive. It reasoned that a lender who actually participates in day-to-day
management would already be liable as an owner/operator and that the
standard of management required by the secured creditor exemption must be
different, otherwise it would be meaningless. Instead, the court determined that
"a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the
facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."52 The Appellate Court's
new standard did not require actual involvement in the facility's management
or hazardous substance control management, but rather financial participation
indicating a "capacity to influence" the facility's hazardous waste practices
would be sufficient to incur liability. 3
The Appellate Court found support for this standard in CERCLA's
legislative history54 and in a public policy rationale. In considering CER-
CLA's policy, the Appellate Court acknowledged criticisms that its theory of
attaching liability to such a broad range of practices would not only discourage
lending to companies with potential hazardous waste problems, but encourage
lenders to distance themselves from the hazardous substance control practices
of all its debtors."5 It responded by suggesting that its standard would do just
the opposite. The court noted that creditors, fearing liability, would be inspired
to investigate their potential debtors' hazardous substance practices, and to
factor all possible risks into their loan agreement.56 Conversely, the Court
reasoned, potential borrowers would understand that improper hazardous waste
management adversely would affect their ability to obtain financing, and would
therefore act more responsibly. 7  Furthermore, the specter of potential
liability creates an incentive for secured lenders to monitor facility practices
after the loan is made.5
Applying this new standard to Fleet, the Appellate Court found ample
reason to deny summary judgment. The court split Fleet's involvement with the
50. See id. at 961.
51. Meet, 901 F.2d at 1557.
52. Id. at 1558.
53. Id. at 1557.
54. See id. at 1558 n.11 (noting that legislative history considered lenders who were "not
otherwise affiliated" to be free from liability, and concluding that liability based on "affiliation"
was triggered by involvement more peripheral than that used in Mirabile's day-to-day operations
standard).
55. Id. at 1558.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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property into three distinct periods. It found that the activity for the first
period, ranging from the beginning of the financial relationship to the winding
down of the bankrupt company in 1981, was insufficient to rise to the level of
incurring liability. 9 Fleet's activity during the period from the winding down
to the auction in June 1982, however, included a substantial degree of control
over SPW's shipping, pricing, employment practices, and plant administra-
tion.6" The Court found these activities and the cleanup attempts of Fleet's
contractors in the post-auction third period to be clearly within CERCLA's
reach.6' Thus, the first circuit court to analyze the scope of lender liability
under CERCLA applied an extremely strict standard to the lender liability
issue, and exposed a significantly large group of lenders to CERCLA's liability
scheme.
In its first decision on lender liability, the Ninth Circuit eased away from
the relatively high standard of liability established by the Fleet court.6' In
Bergsoe, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a non-foreclosing lender that held
title to the contaminated property "merely [as] part of the financing arrange-
ment."'6  Although the court declined to address the issue of a liability
standard directly, it did determine that the secured creditor exemption requires
at least "some actual management... before a secured creditor will fall outside
the exception. ' With this decision, the Ninth Circuit diverged from the
decision in Fleet, which indicated that liability would attach even without actual
management as long as there was "capacity to influence" hazardous waste
decisions. The Ninth Circuit Court was not swayed by the Fleet court's
reasoning and, like earlier District Court decisions, required some activity to be
taken by lenders in order to create CERCLA liability.
The Bergsoe decision thus varies with the Fleet standard by requiring some
participation in management. Together, the remains of the day-to-day oper-
ations standard and automatic foreclosure liability, the Fleet and Bergsoe
standards, and the standard of EPA's rule (considered in Part III), create a
morass of different standards which might be applied to determine lender
liability under CERCLA.
59. /,L at 1559.
60. It is arguable that Fleet's activities in the second and third period would have incurred
liability if the court applied the Mirabile standard instead of creating a new one. This has led
some parties, including the EPA, to characterize the Fleet court's new standard as dicta. See infra
note 89.
61. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1559-60.
62. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 671.
64. Id. at 672 (emphasis in original).
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS
A. Criticism of the Day-to-Day Operations Standard
Both courts and commentators have leveled criticisms at the day-to-day
operations standard." Of all the critiques, probably the most pointed has
been the MBT court's conclusion that the day-to-day operations standard
improperly exempts a lender from liability even after it has foreclosed on a
piece of property. The exempted lender will be able to pay more for "tainted"
property at a foreclosure sale than other bidders because clean-up costs will not
factor into its long-term expected return on the property. And if the property
is cleaned by the government, the lender can sell the property at a substantial
profit.66 Succinctly put, allowing the secured creditor an exemption from
CERCLA liability after it forecloses on contaminated property creates a
windfall for the lender-turned-owner.67 In such situations application of the
day-to-day standard would certainly be improper.
The second critique of Mirabile comes from the Fleet court and focuses on
the definition of owner/operator under CERCLA. The Fleet court rejected the
Mirabile standard as so narrow that it "would essentially require a secured
creditor to be involved in the operations of a facility in order to incur
liability."6 This standard, the court noted, would render the secured lender
exemption ineffective since involvement in operations of a facility would
already create liability as an operator.69 In addition, the Fleet court presented
65. Note that in this context the day-to-day standard refers to the standard and reasoning of
the district court in Mirabile. Though the MBT decision can certainly be considered an alterna-
tive path to liability after foreclosure, this paper chooses not to consider the MBT standard as
a separate standard because it is limited in application to foreclosure situations. See supra note
text accompanying note 39.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
67. This critique has itself been questioned. It has been pointed out, for example, that such
enrichment occurs only if foreclosure comes before remediation; otherwise, increased value
belongs to the owner of the property and not the secured lender. Bruce P. Howard & Melissa
K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1187, 1202-03 (1991). Another commentator has pointed out that the MBT Court itself was not
sure that liability should attach in all cases of foreclosure, James B. Lowrey, Comment, Don't Get
Involved-How Unsuspecting Secured Creditors May Incur Liability Under CERCLA by
"Participating in the Management" of a Debtor's "Facility," 56 Mo. L. REV. 295, 321-22 (1991).
Finally, one other writer has argued that liability under the MBT standard does not attach at
foreclosure but only when the mortgagor purchases the mortgaged property. Scott Wilsdon, Note,
When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1288 (1987). Perhaps most significant is the fact that, in a practical sense,
this windfall will be limited or, perhaps, never occur. For example, it is unlikely that the
government will clean up a property immediately. Until that cleanup is accomplished the lender-
turned-owner will be paying significant carrying costs on the property.
68. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1557.
69. Id.
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a policy analysis that supported its textual interpretation." According to that
analysis, a broad exemption for foreclosing mortgagors would be inconsistent
with Congress' recognition in CERCLA of the seriousness of the hazardous
waste problems and its unwillingness to make the public pay for cleanup.7
One final critic notes problems created by an ambiguous standard for
lender liability.72 Starting with the presumption that monitoring hazardous
waste disposal is of high priority, the writer argues that because of their
expertise in monitoring the economic health of their debtors, and because of
their ability to spread the costs of clean-up, banks should be encouraged to
monitor their client's environmental activities.7" Thus, since "clarity of legal
standards is one factor that affects a lender's decision to extend credit and to
monitor,"' and because a bank will not monitor if it fears such activity might
incur liability, only a narrow standard with a high predictability of liability
would encourage such activity.75 The day-to-day standard focuses on the
individual acts of lenders in individual factual situations. Because it does not
delineate enough specific actions that can clearly be taken without incurring
liability, it limits a lender's ability to lend to and monitor clients that use
hazardous substances. The standard is insufficient because it unjustly enriches
foreclosing lenders, doesn't. correlate with the statutory structure of CERCLA,
and may deter lending by its ambiguity.
B. Fleet Factors: A Hobson's Choice
The Fleet court's reasoning has frequently been criticized as creating a
Hobson's choice. By choosing a standard that found liability when a creditor
was in a position to affect hazardous waste disposal practices, the court created
incentives for secured lenders to investigate and continually monitor the
70. See Wilsdon, supra note 67, at 1261.
71. See id. at 1293.
72. Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation under
Section 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 927 (1989).
73. Id. at 931-33.
74. Id. at 934 n.52 (emphasis in original omitted). Tom also notes that magnitude of liability
is another factor that affects lender decisions. Id. Altering the magnitude of liability for lenders
would, however, alter a fundamental principle of CERCLA liability: Once liable, a PRP is
responsible for the full cost of the problem. This straightforward nature of liability under
CERCLA is one of the statute's great strengths, and altering liability standards would threaten
that underlying structure too greatly. The best approach to influencing lender decisions,
therefore, is to alter the clarity of the standards governing who is liable. This focus on changing
the clarity of the standard rather than the magnitude of liability is the approach taken by this
article as well as most other discussions of lender liability standards.
75. Id. at 931 nn.33, 35. The author accompanies the need for predictability with a high
threshold of liability (i.e., a narrow standard) because a low threshold would encourage banks to
sever their relationships with clients early (to the extent that a bank might actually force a client
into bankruptcy instead of working out a loan). In contrast, a high threshold of liability will allow
banks to both monitor and assist clients with problems, thus possibly benefiting society by
preventing future environmental harm.
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hazardous waste disposal practices of its borrowers.76 Once a loan is made
and a bank is in a position of liability, it will monitor disposal to protect its
interest.77 But when confronted with a nebulous liability standard and the
substantial costs of an average environmental cleanup, lenders might not make
loans.
Banks profit from the accrued interest on loans. As one commentator has
noted, "The huge potential environmental liabilities will often reduce the profit
potential of making loans to such a degree that lenders simply will choose not
to lend."78  They would instead opt for more conservative investments."
Restricting available credit might, therefore, exacerbate the exact environmental
problems that monitoring tries to prevent.8" "Without capital, business cannot
afford to implement the waste reduction practices necessary to protect the
public health and the environment."'" Furthermore, a sharp decrease in
lending to companies with potential or identified hazardous waste risks will
undercut CERCLA's goal of making such parties do the cleanup work
themselves.' In other words, the Fleet standard creates a Hobson's choice for
the lender. A financial institution that conducts environmental audits prior to
lending exposes itself to a significant amount of liability, while a bank that
blindly lends money without audits creates a great risk that it will have to
sustain losses in a write-off if a hazardous release occurs. 3 Neither option is
acceptable. The result could very well be a lack of lending to clients that create
and use hazardous substances.
76. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558.
77. Id. at 1559.
78. Lowrey, supra note 67, at 325.
79. Id. at 326.
80. The Fleet court, in partial response to this criticism, suggests that banks that do lend
money in these circumstances would be able to internalize the extra risk in the form of extra
interest on loans to companies that deal with hazardous substances. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558. At
least two commentators have noted the problems with this view. The first points out that some
companies that'deal with hazardous waste might not be able to afford the higher interest. These
companies are a high risk for leaving a potential hazard uncleaned. This hazard would ultimately
be cleaned with government funds. Lowrey, supra note 67, at 327. Perhaps the more damaging
critique, however, suggests that any belief that a lender "can adequately protect itself by weighing
and incorporating the risks associated with the negative results of [environmental due diligence]
into the terms of its loan documents is ... naive. Rarely can such risks be quantified with any
degree of certainty or comfort, especially when the contours of environmental liability are subject
to the vagaries of judicial interpreters." Timothy R. Zinnecker, Lender Liability Under CERCLA
and the Fleet-ing Protection of the Secured Creditor Exemption, 44 Sw. L. J. 1449, 1470 (1991)
(citations omitted). These critiques again suggest that banks would prefer making more
conservative loans to taking such high risks.
81. Lowrey, supra note 67, at 295 n.195.
82. Id. at 326 n.197.
83. Id. at 327-28.
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III. THE RULE
To address the confusion created by the conflicting lender liability
standards, the EPA developed its own standard for lender liability under
CERCLA.' Released in April, 1992, the final rule is organized around the
definition of three terms found in Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA: "indicia of
ownership," "primarily to protect the security interest," and, most importantly,
"participating in the management of a facility.""5
The bulk of the rule focuses on the most disputed part of the secured
lender exemption: the definition of "participation in the management of a
facility." This part of the rule starts with a qualification, stating that any
determination of what constitutes "participation in the management is fact
sensitive." 6 It then creates a laundry list of activities that are covered by the
secured lender exemption. 7 For activities that are not included in the laundry
list, the rule creates a general definition of participation in management which
considers activities according to where they fall at different times along the life
of the loan, to wit: actions at the inception of the loan, policing the security
interest, loan workout, foreclosure and holding property for disposition, and
liquidation.s
The rule responds to criticisms of earlier court decisions in two important
ways. First, it sets a high standard of liability for creditors to avoid deterring
initial lending. The rule chooses an actual participation standard, rather than
the Fleet standard, for determining which activities involve participation in the
management of a facility. It provides: "Participation in the management of a
facility means, for the purpose of Section 101 (20)(A), actual participation in the
management or operational affairs. . . by the holder and does not include the
mere capacity, or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to control, facility
84. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1993)). The vast majority
of the EPA's publication is the preamble ezcplaining the background of the rule and explaining
its effect. Most of the references to the rule will be to this text.
The rule, though recently vacated, will continue to play a significant role in the lender
liability debate. See supra notes 10 and 11.
85. The first two terms, "indicia of ownership" and "primarily to protect the security interest"
are dealt with summarily. The rule treats "indicia of ownership" broadly; defining the interest
simply as an "interest in real or personal property securing a loan or other obligation." 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1100(a)(1). The rule also does little to help further define what "primarily to protect the
security interest" means. It simply notes that, in general, a security interest provides the holder
with recourse against real or personal property of the person pledging the security if an obligation
to pay money is not met, and then goes on to list certain recognized forms of security interests.
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b). It further states that protecting the security interest means holding
ownership as a means of protecting a security interest and not as an investment. 40 C.F.R. §
300.1100(b)(2). Such definitions add little to one's understanding of the secured lender
exemption.
86. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c).
87. See 40 C.F.R. §300.1100(c)(2).
88. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)-(d).
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operations." 9 Thus, the rule accepts a narrow reading of the term "participa-
tion in the management," freeing lenders at least from the initial Hobson's
choice created by Fleet. Under this rule, lenders could extend credit without
fear that their purely financial relationship with a borrower would make them
susceptible to CERCLA liability.
The second way the rule responds to earlier decisions is found in its
attempts to alleviate the ambiguity of the participation in management
standards.90 It does this by delineating specific activities that lenders may
undertake without fear of liability. 1 For example, the rule allows banks to
inspect and monitor their security interest. 2 It also allows lenders in the
context of a loan workout to take action "with respect to the facility to secure
or safeguard the security interest from loss."93  To maintain exemption
coverage, however, these actions must be limited to protecting and preserving
the security interest.94 Thus, the rule gives lenders a broad, but somewhat
qualified, leeway of activity, which would allow them to properly protect and
maintain their security without fear of incurring severe environmental liability.
The single most important activity which the rule would allow lenders to
undertake is foreclosure. Contrary to the MBT court's decision," the rule
states that foreclosure would not void the secured lender exemption as long as
it is reasonably necessary to ensure satisfaction or performance of the
89. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1). Note that it would be misleading to say the rulemakers
believed there were two standards from which to "choose." Rather the rulemakers chose to
characterize the actual participation standard as applied uniformly by all courts-relegating the
Fleet court standard to the realm of dicta. Thus, the preamble states that though the Fleet court
suggested that a capacity to influence management might be enough to incur liability, the Fleet
court held that some degree of actual participation was required. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,345.
90. Id.
91. 40 C.F.R. §300.1100(c)(2).
92. The preamble treats inspection and monitoring separately. Inspection is treated under the
title of actions at the "Inception of the Loan." The rule expressly provides that this action is not
required to maintain exemption coverage. It states: "Neither the statute nor this regulation
requires a holder to conduct or require an inspection to qualify for the exemption." 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1100(c)(2)(i). Monitoring is treated under the title of "Policing the Security Interest."
While the rulemakers note their appreciation of such activity, they, again, do not require it. The
applicable text states: "A holder who engages in policing activities prior to foreclosure will
remain within the exemption provided that the holder does not by such actions participate in the
management of the vessel or facility .... Such actions include, but are not limited to,... taking
other actions to adequately police the loan or security interest (such as requiring a borrower to
comply with any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises from the
borrower)." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(A).
93. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (c)(2)(ii)(B).
94. Id. The exact amount of leeway to actually participate in management during workout
is unpredictable. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,355 (acknowledging that some commentators have
suggested that the general rule is both imprecise and unclear because it contains new definitions).
95. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 18,361 (attempting
to reconcile the rule with the MBT court's reasoning).
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underlying obligation." Furthermore, the rule also allows the lender to do
anything necessary to preserve the value of the collateral-including taking
steps to prevent or minimize the risk of a release of hazardous substanc-
es-without voiding the exemption.97 Also, the lender-turned-owner would be
allowed to hold and maintain the premises indefinitely, as long as it advertised
the property for sale and did not reject an offer for "fair consideration."9 "
Thus, the rule attempts to clarify activities that can be taken during all
phases of the life of a loan without incurring liability. This, accompanied by a
more definite liability standard, is an important attempt to deal with major
problems raised by earlier judicial decisions. It is, however, important to view
the rule in the context of its policy and practical effects before judging its
efficacy.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE RULE
As previously mentioned, the rule responds to certain criticisms of the Fleet
and Mirabile standards by choosing a high threshold of liability and creating a
"laundry list" of activities a secured creditor can undertake without incurring
liability. Certainly, the creation of a definite and high liability threshold is a
positive change suggested by the rule. Under the rule's standard, banks could,
generally, lend more freely because they would not fear that CERCLA liability
would attach immediately or shortly after the loan is made. Encouraging the
availability of loans is still, of course, a priority. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the rule's specific exemptions would allow banks the freedom
to lend while creating an incentive for secured lenders to help monitor and
control hazardous substances.
A. Incentive Problems
The rule's exemptions for secured lenders are too broad. As a result, it
sacrifices incentives to properly handle hazardous substances. For example, the
rule gives lenders freedom to inspect and monitor their borrower's disposal and
control practices without sacrificing their exemption. Otherwise, the rule
reasons, banks would be deterred from monitoring and inspecting their security.
96. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d).
97. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2). An interesting addition to this view of lenders as owners after
foreclosure is the preamble comment that "if the release [or threat of release of hazardous
substances] occurred in connection with activities undertaken at the direction of an on-scene
coordinator (under § 107(d)(1) of CERCLA), then evidence of a release is not relevant to the
issue of whether the holder has participated in management." 57 Fed. Reg. 18,355. Thus, the
rule hints that the rulemakers do not desire to insert lending institutions into the CERCLA
liability scheme, but that they view lenders as outside parties who voluntarily clean hazardous
releases on the site of their security.
98. 40 C.F.R. §300.1100(d)(1). For a definition of "fair consideration," see 40 C.F.R.
§300.1100(d)(2)(ii)(A).
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The rule, however, does not require banks to monitor and inspect their security
and, as will be shown hereafter, the market incentives for such types of activity
are wholly inadequate."°
1. Monitoring and Inspection
Most proponents of the rule argue that a lender's desire to ensure the value
of its security will provide an incentive to monitor and inspect. This argument,
however, misses two important considerations. First, a lender will not conduct
the same amount of inspection and monitoring to protect the value of its secur-
ity as it would to protect itself against extensive CERCLA liability. Most
releases will occur (or be discovered) substantially into the life of a loan, and
therefore lenders will rarely have to worry about recovering their entire security
value."0' Because the magnitude of a lender's incentive to ensure the value
of its security is only commensurate with the outstanding debt, the typical
incentive to monitor will be minor when compared with possible CERCLA
liability, especially where the secured value is relatively small to start with. It
follows that lenders subject to cleanup liability would have a much greater
incentive to inspect and monitor to prevent releases than would lenders exempt
from that liability.
Second, it is unnecessary to consider the above argument under EPA's rule
because the present exemption for foreclosure removes almost any existing
incentive to preserve security value. The rule allows the lender/owner to sell
the property after a strict foreclosure and EPA cleanup. In such cases, the
lender can take any value equal to or above the amount secured by the
property."w Thus, the foreclosure exemption removes the original impetus for
lenders to inspect or monitor by assuring them that they will be able to recoup
the entire value0 3 (or more) of their security whether environmentally
contaminated or not.
2. Working Out the Loan
Another incentive problem arises with workout situations. The rule's
treatment of this issue is ambiguous, but suggests that banks can do many
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100. It is also important to consider that under the standard of liability itself, which requires
active participation in management, monitoring and inspection activity would rarely rise to the
level of incurring liability. Thus the exemption seems to be only for those cases where
monitoring and inspection are so profuse that they actually affect the way business deals with
hazardous substances on a day-to-day basis.
101. This does not apply to revolving credit situations.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d).
103. Admittedly, the lender will expend significant sums in maintaining the improvement prior
to cleanup. It is not clear, however, whether this cost could be recovered as part of the debt
pursuant to a note or mortgage.
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things other parties would not be allowed to do without incurring liability."
Such an exemption would allow, though not require, banks to take any action
necessary to work out a loan with a business without being deterred by fear of
liability. Allowing the lender this latitude without creating environmental
liability may create disincentives to manage an industry safely.
In many workout situations, lenders do not get their money back by taking
the security. Instead, they rely on creating income for the company to repay
the loan. This need to create income may very well directly conflict with any
interest in maintaining hazardous substance programs, because banks will want
to limit any such costs in favor of allocating more money to pay their note.
This is particularly unfortunate because in a workout situation, where the
borrower is seeking to appease the lender, banks are particularly well
positioned to influence the environmental policies of borrowers. Absent the
incentive provided by the threat of liability, lenders may forgo opportunities to
protect the environment in an effort to extract as much income from the
company as possible."5
Backers of the rule might respond that the incentive to clean exists in the
desire to preserve the equity in the security interest, just in case the need to
foreclose on the security interest arises, and because any hazardous release
problem will greatly decrease the available cash to pay off any loan at all.
These arguments, however, are susceptible to similar criticisms as the arguments
for monitoring considered above. At present, the foreclosure exemption serves
to remove much of the incentive lenders would have to maintain their security.
3. Foreclosure
As has been pointed out in the two previous sections, the foreclosure
loophole presently contained in the rule creates tremendous disincentives for
any lender to spend money to monitor, inspect, or clean up property. This
loophole, in addition to the previously mentioned exemptions, must be
reconsidered by rulemakers, legislators, and courts.
The rule still suffers from the same problem originally described by the
MBT Court."6 As the exception presently stands, a lender can foreclose on
property and purchase it at the foreclosure sale for lower cost than potential
buyers faced with CERCLA liability. These lenders can then sell the property
after government clean up. While the rule does require a lender to consider
any offer on the property that equals the amount owed them,0 7 it does not
preclude the lender from accepting offers above the fair market price.'
104. See supra note 86.
105. In this regard one must also remember that bank officers are often remunerated
according to the money they can salvage through loan workout arrangements. This provides
tremendous incentive to squeeze income out of an industry to the exclusion of environmental
concerns.
106. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 98.
108. Drafters of the rule attempted to respond to this argument by suggesting that foreclosure
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Thus, lenders are virtually assured of recovering their security and possibly of
making substantial profit from it. In this case such an exemption might enrich
a lender who already made money (in the form of interest) from the same
industry that created an environmental release.
B. Correlation With CERCLA
Another problem with the secured lender exemption is that it ignores the
essence of CERCLA policy and effectiveness: the threat of liability. A
potentially responsible party is jointly and severally liable for the entire cleanup
cost which can run into millions of dollars. The statutory scheme creates
incentives to properly handle hazardous substances based on this fear of
substantial liability. Exempting lenders from the scheme, especially considering
their ability to influence the disposal of hazardous substance, substantially
interferes with the basic functioning of the statute. In addition, CERCLA's
scheme intends that those who profit from the creation or use of hazardous
substances should be the ones liable for cleaning it up. Lenders make money
by lending to industry, and, occasionally, by running it. As a result, they should
not be completely exempt from liability. These considerations suggest that
CERCLA standards should create liability for secured lenders.
V. POSSIBLE RESPONSES
I suggest in this section two possible responses to the current lender
liability problem. The first incorporates various changes to CERCLA's lender
liability standard. This response, however, would require a substantial
commitment of resources, and it would further complicate an already heavily
regulated area of the law. The second suggestion is much simpler. This
approach would not solve every contingency which arises with lender liability,
but it would require a much smaller capital outlay. Both solutions incorporate
considerations which should be taken into account in order to move the law in
an environmentally and economically responsible direction.
A. A Statutory Change
As earlier analysis showed, one of the problems with the EPA's rule on
lender liability is that it removes incentives for lenders to take environmentally
responsible actions in loan transactions. To solve this problem, CERCLA itself
must be changed to require lenders to take specific actions to preserve their
law does not generally result in such an allocation and that, should a lender gain a windfall, the
EPA would bring suit based on that lender's unjust enrichment. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,361. This
suggestion, however, is simply improper, as foreclosure law would generally result in just such an
allocation.
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statutory exemption. For example, during the life of a loan, lenders would be
in the best position to ensure that borrowers comply with hazardous substance
monitoring, inspection, and control measures outlined by the EPA for the
industry of each borrower. Under this sort of scheme, a supervising lender
would incur liability for a release if the borrower deviates from the proper
control measures. Thus, lenders would not be fearful of lending, working out
loans, or any other activity they would undertake as a secured lender because
they would be exempt as long as they followed certain guidelines as to
monitoring, inspecting and controlling hazardous substances. 9
It would be relatively simple to overcome various practical difficulties with
this statutory scheme. The extra cost of these environmental precautions, which
might be considered a disincentive to lending in the first instance, could easily
be covered by minimally increasing the interest rate of all loans made to
debtors with a high risk of hazardous waste contamination. Higher interest
rates would have the advantage of internalizing the cost of environmental
hazards for companies borrowing money. As for enforcement, lenders would
be required to show that they have taken all designated steps for ensuring
compliance with any particular borrower. If such a showing was made, the
lender would not be liable as a matter of law. Where they do not act in an
environmentally responsible manner, banks would remain jointly and severally
liable for cleanup costs.
A statutory scheme such as this achieves many of the results desired by
both lenders and environmentalists; not only would banks be secure in their
interests, but hazardous substances would be more effectively controlled in
borrowing industries, thus minimizing hazardous substance releases in the
future. While this new scheme would not comport with the current "participa-
tion in the management standard," it would still correspond to the overall spirit
of CERCLA. Banks would not be immediately susceptible to CERCLA's strict
liability scheme (such immediate liability would seriously limit initial lending),
but they would nonetheless have to bear some of the burden of overseeing
environmental compliance. Only an approach like this can ensure that banks
take the responsibility for encouraging and perhaps requiring measures to
ensure environmental protection.
This type of broad regulatory scheme would, admittedly, be resource
intensive. It would require the creation of standards for control of hazardous
substances, as well as for the proper amount of monitoring and inspection for
every type of industry,."0 Furthermore, such a system would be extremely
109. The concept of requiring such activity by lenders is by no means farfetched. The first
two versions of the rule on lender liability actually contained a requirement for inspection and
monitoring. Citing a fear of overburdening lenders, the OMB had this requirement removed
from the final rule.
110. An analogous program does exist in the present Clean Water Act. See Federal Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). This program requires the
EPA to establish Best Management Practices (BMP's) for different types of industry on how to
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complex. Lenders would face an increasing number of regulatory requirements,
further straining an already heavily regulated banking system. The burdens,
however, may be worth the cost if they exist within a program for dealing with
hazardous substances that is both environmentally and commercially sound.
B. New Standard
A more direct and less resource-intensive approach to this problem of
lender liability would be the adoption of a standard that would create lender
liability as soon as the lender enters the workout stage with a borrower or
forecloses on a property."' Because the standard still creates a high threshold
of liability, it will not deter initial lending, except in extreme circumstances.
Creditors should thus be able to lend without fear of liability attaching
automatically. Furthermore, the standard would also create incentives for
lenders to substantially inspect and monitor the industry to which they lend.
In this way the lender will reduce the risk of environmental problems to a
minimum should the contingency of loan workout or foreclosure arise.
When property is clean and properly run, banks will certainly have
incentive to enter workout arrangements with the borrower; the alternative is
to lose any value that they retain in the property. Furthermore, once a bank
enters workout with a borrower, it will have the added control necessary to
ensure that no hazardous release occurs. The workout standard should thus
create incentives to keep business clean while not substantially deterring lending
or workout opportunities.
This liability standard should also internalize the costs of clean up should
a release occur during or after loan workout. First, the standard of liability
would be predictable enough for banks to be able to internalize costs.
Secondly, the fear that lenders will not be able to estimate costs of clean up will
also be circumscribed by the limited number of cleanups lenders will have to
undertake. Thus, lenders will have added some certainty to their ability to
quantify risk, allowing them to pass on cleanup costs to industry that uses
hazardous materials in the form of higher interest rates. In summation, the
"workout liability standard" is a definite standard and creates a high enough
threshold of liability that lending should not be deterred.
As for borrowers that are known to have a high risk of environmental
problems, banks will be free to decide whether they should lend and what
premium should attach. They will also know whether they should enter
workout agreements with, or foreclose on, a business if they know that they will
remove pollutants from waste water. Id. at § 1329(b)(2)(A). Best management standards for
hazardous material control could follow a similar development plan.
111. This "workout" standard will probably result in liability for lenders at a similar stage in
the lender-borrower relationship as the "participation in the management" standard. That is, a
lender does not usually assert the kind of control that would rise to a level of participation in
management until a loan needs to be worked out. The decided advantage to a "workout"
standard, however, is that it provides certainty as to when liability will attach to lenders.
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incur substantial liability for doing so. The result, of course, is that those
businesses that are likely to have environmental problems will sit uncleaned and
the bank will not get its money through either workout payments or foreclo-
sure. This extra risk, however, will be passed on to industry in the form of
interest, while the lenders themselves will not be liable for clean up costs.
Perhaps applying a rule creating a trade off between the EPA and lending
institutions, as outlined in the previous section, would create viable results. In
such a situation, the lender would have to satisfy criteria that showed the
borrower was not financially able to pay for clean up. After satisfying these
criteria the lender would be exempted from liability but required to administer
a clean up of the hazardous release before it could collect its money."
Admittedly, a program such as this would be a compromise, but in such cases,
compromise might be expedient.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases considering lender liability under CERCLA have created
different standards of liability, and the EPA has attempted to provide an
overarching rule to address problems with those standards. Unfortunately,
these standards have consistently bypassed better solutions. EPA's standard,
for example, would give too much to lenders. By exempting foreclosing
lenders, it would sacrifice the opportunity to offer numerous incentives that
would encourage lenders to inspect, monitor, and otherwise promote environ-
mentally responsible activity by its borrowers. These lost opportunities invite
such standards to be completely rethought. While there might not be any
perfect solution to the lender liability problem, there are certainly ways in
which the current standards can be made substantially better.
112. The idea embodied in some state statutes of limiting a lender who forecloses on (or in
this case works out) a loan to the value of the property might also be adaptable to this situation.
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